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Abstract
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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4375
This paper studies gross worker flows to explain the 
rising informality in Brazilian metropolitan labor markets 
from 1983 to 2002. This period covers two economic 
cycles, several stabilization plans, a far-reaching trade 
liberalization, and changes in labor legislation through 
the Constitutional reform of 1988. First, focusing on 
cyclical patterns, the authors confirm that for Brazil, 
the patterns of worker transitions between formality 
and informality correspond primarily to the job-to-job 
dynamics observed in the United States, and not to the 
traditional idea of the informal queuing for jobs in a 
This paper—a product of the Chief Economist Office, Latin America and Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to understand labor market dynamics and the nature of informality. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at wmaloney@worldbank.org.
segmented market. However, the analysis also confirms 
distinct cyclical patterns of job finding and separation 
rates that lead to the informal sector absorbing more 
labor during downturns. Second, focusing on secular 
movements in gross flows and the volatility of flows, the 
paper finds the rise in informality to be driven primarily 
by a reduction in job finding rates in the formal sector. 
A small fraction of this is driven by trade liberalization, 
and the remainder seems driven by rising labor costs and 
reduced flexibility arising from Constitutional reform. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In a single decade, from the mid 1990 to 2000, the share of the Brazilian 
metropolitan area work force unprotected by labor legislation and thereby classified as 
“informal” rose an astronomical 10 percentage points. This episode is of relevance for 
several reasons.  
 
First, such movements have been relatively common over the last decade: Urban 
informality increased in Argentina from 1992 to 2003 by 10 percentage points; in 
Venezuela from 1995 to 2003 by 8 percentage points.
1  To the degree that such increases 
represent the progressive exposure of the work force to risk and loss of other benefits, 
they are intrinsically worrying.   
 
Second, understanding the causes of these movements can contribute to our 
understanding of the drivers of informality more generally. Brazil offers several dramatic 
policy changes across the period that theory suggests could affect gross labor flows and 
their volatility and hence the steady state size of the formal sector: a far reaching trade 
reform, and the establishment of a new Constitution in 1988 that had substantial impacts 
on labor costs and flexibility.   
 
Third, unlike Argentina or Venezuela, Brazil offers an excellent panel data set 
that, with perhaps the exception of Mexico, is one of the very few in the developing 
world to have a sufficient time dimension for us to study the shifts in magnitudes of gross 
labor flows associated with two complete business cycles and the secular recomposition 
of the labor force.   
 
This paper first applies recent advances in the study of labor market dynamics 
over the business cycle, introduced by Shimer (2005b) and Hall (2005) and confirms for 
Brazil the patterns identified for the US and for Mexico by Bosch and Maloney (2006): 
                                                 
1 See Gasparini and Tornarolli (2006) 
  2the informal sector does not, as a first approximation, correspond to the disadvantaged 
sector of a segmented market.
2 That said, the relatively higher volatility of job finding 
rates in the formal sector leaves the informal sector absorbing more labor during 
downturns. 
 
The paper then explores the determinants of the secular changes in gross labor 
flows that drove the increase in informality across the 1990s. We find that the driving 
dynamic was a reduction in formal sector hiring across the period. In explaining this 
reduction, trade liberalization had a statistically significant but relatively minor role while 




As can be inferred from Table 1, in 1980, roughly 35% of the Brazilian labor 
force was found either managing small micro firms either as employers or independent 
self-employed, or working for firms of various sizes without a signed work card that 
would guarantee access to benefits. The implications of such a large uncovered sector 
have been the subject of sharp debate for decades. The dominant perspective with 
intellectual roots dating at least from Harris and Todaro (1970), equates the sector with 
underemployment or disguised unemployment- the disadvantaged sector of a market 
segmented by rigidities in the “formal” or covered sector of the economy.   However, 
another emerging view keys more off the mainstream self-employment literature in the 
                                                 
2 In one of the first works studying gross job flows, Blanchard and Diamond (1991) argued that slowdowns 
of the economy are characterized by a significant increase in the number of workers transitioning from 
employment into unemployment. Consistent with this, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990 and 1992) in a series 
of papers using establishment data showed that job destruction is countercyclical.  Both sets of findings 
constituted empirical support for the predominant search and matching models in the Mortensen and 
Pissarides tradition. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999a and 1999b), Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) and Pries and Rogerson (2005), Rogerson et al. (2005) for a review of these models and their 
implications.  However, recently Shimer (2005b) and Hall (2005) have argued that, in fact, job separations 
are largely acyclical, while the finding rate is highly procyclical.  That is, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, unemployment rises because jobs become hard to find, not because they are destroyed.  Further, 
Shimer (2005b) argues that the response of vacancies and unemployment to productivity shocks predicted 
by a standard search model explains only around 10% of the observed volatility of the job finding rate. 
Explaining these stylized facts, Shimer (2005b) and Hall (2005) argue, requires introducing wage rigidities 
into standard matching models.   
 
  3style of Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982) and Evans and Leighton (1989), and argues that, 
as a first approximation, the sector should be seen as an unregulated, largely voluntary 
self-employed/micro firm sector.
3   
 
While the informal sector in all likelihood contains both types of actors, disguised 
unemployed and entrepreneurs, its exaggerated size in developing countries raises the 
stakes surrounding the relative proportions dramatically: if the roughly 35-60 percent of 
the Latin American workers found in the informal sector show dynamics similar to those 
of the unemployed, then the labor market distortions in the formal sector are indeed large 
and the case for massive reform to eliminate segmentation, compelling.  However, should 
the dynamics correspond more to a voluntary small firm sector that offers an alternative, 
but not obviously inferior income source then aggregate labor force dynamics may differ 
from what has been found in the US, but will not necessarily suggest pathology.    
 
  In all likelihood, there are elements of both at work.  The lower opportunity cost 
of being self-employed in poor countries may raise the share of uncovered self-employed 
workers in developing countries (See Blau 1987, Maloney 2001).  On the other hand, 
minimum wages or union wage setting have clearly proved able to generate segmented 
markets.  In an intermediate position, in theoretical frameworks in the matching tradition 
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, 1999a, 1999b, Pries and Rogerson 2005), firing costs or 
other labor taxes may lead to a reduction in labor demand without inducing segmentation 
per se.  That is, workers are still indifferent between formal and informal sectors, but the 
formal sector demand curve has shifted down.  Further, the institutional framework can 
also generate incentives for workers to opt out of formality: subsidized social services 
delinked from the labor contract, or labor taxes passed on to workers that do not 
correspond to an equally valued benefit all shift the labor supply curve to the left.   Thus, 
it is entirely possible for the formal and informal labor markets to be very integrated in 
the sense of offering jobs of similar quality at the margin, while the institutional structure 
may be characterized by substantial distortions (see Maloney 2004, Levy 2006).   
                                                 
3 For a review of the literature and early work on transition matrices in developing country see Maloney 
(1999, 2004)   
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  Clearly, this debate over the causes of informality extends to the drivers of 
changes in the share of informality as well and this gives the Brazilian case its salience.  
Far reaching trade reform began in the mid 1980s but intensified around 1990.  As Table 
2 shows, import penetration ratios rose and effective rates of protection fell significantly. 
In a matching model, the resulting reduction in rents would lead to a reduction in the 
value of a vacancy and hence to a reduction in hiring in the formal sector, although not 
necessarily segmentation, leaving the residual of the work force to recur to the informal 
sector.  To date, the most thorough test of the hypothesis of a relationship between trade 
liberalization and informality was undertaken by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) who, 
exploiting sectoral variation in protection across time, found no relationship between the 
share of informality and the reduction in trade protection in Brazil, and a modest 
relationship in Colombia.  However, Gonzaga, Menezes Filho, and Terra (2006) identify 
important effects of the Brazilian trade liberalization on the allocation of workers 
between skilled and unskilled-intensive sectors as well skill-unskilled earnings 
differentials suggesting non-trivial impacts on the labor market that might have an 
informal sector counterpart.  By extending the series on protection levels and studying the 
behavior of job finding and job destruction rates in response to protection variables, we 
are able to revisit this question in the context of gross worker flows and find evidence of 
a significant, albeit very modest, impact of trade reforms on informality.    
 
  The 1988 Constitutional changes had important implications for the labor code in 
several areas that theory predicts could lead to increasing informality. First, there was a 
generalized increase in labor costs and reduction in formal employer flexibility.   
Maximum working hours per week were reduced from 48 to 44, overtime remuneration 
was increased from 1.2 to 1.5 times the normal wage rate; vacation pay was raised from 
one to 4/3 of the monthly wage, and maternity leave increased from 90 to 120 days.
4  
Second, some limitations on the power of organized labor were relaxed. Unions were no 
longer required to be registered and approved by the Ministry of Labor; decisions to 
                                                 
4 Paes de Barros and Corsueil (2001) among others also note that the maximum continuous work day was 
reduced from 8 to 6 hours although the exact meaning of this is unclear given that 8 hours remains the 
standard work day.    
  5strike were left entirely to union discretion, the required advance notification to the 
employer cut from five to two days, and strikes in certain strategic sectors were no longer 
banned.  Finally, firing costs were raised.  The penalty levied on employers for 
unjustified dismissal, a category encompassing most separations considered legitimate for 
economic reasons in the US, increased by four times from 10% to 40,% of the 
accumulated separation account (FGTS, Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço).  
 
  To date, the most comprehensive work relating these changes to the functioning 
of the labor market was undertaken by Paes de Barros and Corseuil (2001) who find that 
separation rates decreased after the Constitutional changes for short employment spells 
and increased for longer spells, but find inconclusive results on the impacts on flows into 
informality from the formal sector.  However, again, matching models suggest that 
several of these reforms would lead to a reduction in hiring (job finding) rates as opposed 
to the separations that Paes de Barros and Corsueil study. By exploiting cross industry 
variation in proxies related to these reforms, we find suggestive evidence that the 
Constitutional reform had very strong impacts through this second channel.    
 
  We begin by exploring the cyclical behavior of gross labor flows to shed light on 
the nature of the role of the informal sector in the labor market.  We then examine the 
determinants of the movements in flows that underlie the secular increase in informality 
across the period. 
    
II. Data 
We draw on the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, 
hereafter PME
5) that conducts extensive monthly household interviews in 6 of the major 
metropolitan regions
6 and covers roughly 25% of the national labor market. The 
questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labor market, wages, 
hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such employment surveys.  The PME is 
                                                 
5 For descriptions of the methodology underlying the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, see Sedlacek, Barros 
and Varandas (1990), IBGE (1991) and Oliveira (1999). 
6 São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife and Salvador. 
  6structured as a rotating panel, tracking each household across four consecutive months 
and then dropping it from the sample for 8 months, then reintroducing it again for another 
4 months. Each month one fourth of the sample is substituted with a new panel. Thus, 
after 4 months the whole initial sample has been rotated, after 8 months a third different 
sample is being surveyed, and after 12 months the initial sample is interviewed.  Over a 
period of two years, three different panels of households are surveyed, and the process 
starts again with three new panels. To minimize problems induced by attrition that 
increases with the time between interviews, we focus exclusively in the first two 
observations. Regrettably, the PME was drastically modified in 2002 and it is not 
possible to reconcile the new and old definitions for unemployment and job sectors.
7 
Hence, our analysis begins in 1983 but stops at 2002.  
  
  There is broad consensus in the literature on the definition of informality from a 
labor market perspective both in the mainstream and Brazilian literature. A 
comprehensive survey of work studying the size and evolution of the Brazilian informal 
sector in the labor market can be found in Ulyssea (2005) and a summary of stylized facts 
of the eighties and nineties is detailed in Ramos and Reis (1997), Ramos (2002), Ramos 
and Brito (2003), Veras (2004), and Ramos and Ferreira (2005a,b). We follow this 
literature in definition by dividing employed workers into three sectors: formal salaried 
(F)-public employees and workers whose contract is registered in his/her work-card or 
carteira de trabalho
8 that entitle the worker to labor rights and benefits; informal salaried 
(I), salaried workers in private firms without carteira; and informal self employed (S.E.). 
Ideally, following the ILO we would distinguish by firm size as well, focusing on 
establishments of fewer than 5-10 as informal employees, however the PME does not 
tabulate this information and hence, we rely purely on the basis of lack of signed 
carteira- as the critical distinguishing characteristic.
9
                                                 
7 We are grateful to Lauro Ramos for providing the old PME dataset for 2002. 
8 According to the Brazilian legislation, registered workers are the ones whose labor contract is registered 
on their work-card. This registration entitles them to several wage and non-wage benefits such as 30 days 
of paid holiday per year, contribution for social security, right to request unemployment benefit in case of 
dismissal, monetary compensation if dismissed without a fair cause, maternity and paternity paid leave and 
so on. 
9 The ILO defines informality as consisting of all own-account workers (but excluding administrative 
workers, professionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, and employers and employees working in 
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The remainder of the sample is divided into two non-employment groups identical 
to those in the advanced country literature: those out of the labor force (O.L.F.), and the 
unemployed (U).  The behavior or these two groups has also received substantial 
attention in the US literature and, while not the focus of our analysis, we document how 
similarly they behave in Brazil. Tables 1 and 3 retrieve the sector sizes and some worker 
characteristics for all five different sectors.   
 
III. Overview: The Brazilian Labor Market, 1983-2002 
 
Movements in employment shares 
We first focus at the evolution of each sector’s share of the labor force from 1983-
2002. The period from the late 1980s to the first half of the 1990s was a turbulent one, 
comprising a persistent hyperinflation and six major stabilization plans designed to 
control it, a Constitutional change, and several other reforms including a dramatic 
reduction in barriers to trade.  Across the whole period Brazil experienced one major and 
two minor recoveries, the 1990 crises, and  slow downs in 1999 and 2001 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 2 plots the unemployment rate and the share of workers out of the labor force and 
Figure 3 the sizes of formal, informal and self employed sectors. Table 1 provides more 
detail for 1983, 1989 and 2002, and Table 3 the corresponding worker characteristics.  
 
We divide the period into 4 periods, broadly linking the evolution of the macro 
economy and the labor markets. 
 
Period 1: Recovery (1985-1989).   The recovery from the recession of the early 
1980’s reduced unemployment to levels hovering around 2%.  Triple-digit inflation 
                                                                                                                                                 
establishments with less than 5. In fact, Bosch and Maloney (2006) find that in Mexico, the ILO’s criteria 
of small firm size and ours of lack of registration are similar in motivation conceptually and lead to a great 
deal of overlap. 75% of informal workers are found in firms of 10 or fewer workers. Since owners of firms 
or self-employed are not obliged to pay social security contributions for themselves, we in fact consider 
them as informal self-employed with no social security contributions (and hence without the benefits that 
are perceived by salaried workers holding a carteira). 
 
  8persisted despite the 1986 Cruzado Plan, which created a new currency, eliminated 
monetary correction, and froze wages and prices.  1988-89 saw the reforms of the 
Constitution and labor legislation.
10
 
Period 2: Plan Collor and structural reforms (1990-1994). The economy entered 
a deep recession and record inflation rates in 1990. The Collor Plan undertook sweeping 
economic reforms and greater integration into the world economy and in 
September/October 1991, the exchange rate was again pegged. Despite the modest 
increment in unemployment during this episode (rising from 2% to 3%), it was here that 
the secular trends in formal and informal shares became pronounced.  
 
Period 3: Recovery (1995-1998). The Tequila crises led to only a slight slowdown 
in mid-1995 after which Brazil experienced a period of recovery with low and stable rates 
of unemployment, but continued sustained growth of the informal sector. 
 
Period 4: External shocks (1999-2001). The Asian and Russian crises of 1999 
contributed to abandoning the peg of the Real to the US dollar and a modest recession. In 
addition, the 2001 slow down of the U.S. economy led to a minor economic slowdown. 
Unemployment increased mildly around 1 percentage point across the period and growth 
resumed at a steady rate in 2002.  
 
  By the end of this period, informality appears to have leveled off at a new plateau 
roughly 10 percentage points above its level at the beginning of the 1990s at roughly 50% 
of the employed workforce.  This trend is now well documented in the literature (see for 
example Ramos and Ferreira (2005ab), Ramos and Reis (1997), The World Bank and 
IPEA (2002)). Ramos (2002) suggests that the increasing informality was associated with 
a structural component rather than with a cyclical one and stresses the increasing share of 
services/nontradables (typically an absorber of informal labor) along with the reduction 
of manufacturing/tradable sectors (traditional absorber of the formal workforce), but 
                                                 
10 See Paes de Barros and Corseuil (2001) for a summary of the most influential labor related constitutional 
changes. 
  9finds that only 25% of the rise can be explained by such an intersectoral reassignment. 
Similarly, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) find that when decomposing the change in the 
share of informal workers in total employment between 1987 and 1998 into within and 
between industry shifts, eighty-eight percent of the increase in the informal employment 
in Brazil stems from movement of workers from formal to informal jobs within 
industries.
11  Hence, the source of the documented trend is largely working through the 
composition of subsectors of workers, formal and informal, as opposed to the structure of 
the economy.   
 
IV. Gross Flows of Workers 
 
The analysis of gross worker flows in Brazil is rendered complicated by the 
substantial macro volatility just documented that accompanied the secular tendencies that 
are our primary interest.  In particular, it is difficult to know whether we are seeing a 
change in how the labor market adjusts to shocks due to micro economic reforms, or the 
secular adjustment to a new macro policy regime.  In what follows, we will attempt to 
tease these apart.  Generally speaking, we find patterns of overall gross flows of workers 
and their complement, duration within sectors, that are consistent with previous work in 
Mexico and, in many cases, the OECD, that suggest that the informal sectors behave 
much more like alternative modes of employment than unemployment.  However, there is 
strong evidence of a sharp change in the early 1990s.  
 
To understand both cyclical and secular movements, we study the transition of 
workers among the distinct various sectors of work.  The transition probabilities among 
sectors are generated, as in Bosch and Maloney (2006) by assuming an underlying 
continuous time Markov process can be estimated from the discrete transition data. The 
details on the estimation process are in Annex 1.  
 
                                                 
11 Similar results are reported by Bosch and Maloney (2006) for the Mexican case. 
  10Table 4 reports the summary of transition intensities through the workforce 
pooling the entire 1983 to 2002 sample. These average results show that duration in 
unemployment is very short (a bit more than one month) while inactivity (OLF) is close 
to ten months with the probability of acceding to a job correspondingly higher in the 
former. Relative durations of employment types are similar to those found elsewhere for 
Mexico and Argentina: informal salaried workers show the lowest duration (2 months), 
informal self employed the next longest (4 months) and formal salaried the longest at 
roughly 10 months.
12  Raw durations (Figure 4) show substantial secular decline of 
roughly 35% in the formal sector across the period and complementary  movements in 
Informal Salaried and unemployment from the late 1980s.  Both may be consistent with 
the shifting of longer tenure workers from the formal to the informal salaried sector and 
greater difficulty in leaving unemployment.  
 
To study cyclical movements, we first time-aggregate the underlying monthly 
data to quarterly averages. We then follow Shimer (2005a) and remove the trends of the 
quarterly averages of each variable using a Hodrick Prescott Filter.  Finally, we smooth 
the results by computing moving averages of the filtered series with a centered window 
of three quarters. The middle periods of these rolling windows are depicted in Figure 4 
along with filtered GDP. As is the case in Mexico and the US, countercyclical 
movements are observed in the durations of the three employment sectors. However, in 
the early 1990s, the pattern becomes muddier. The very high correlations between 
detrended durations of formal and informal salaried employment (0.83) suggests that the 
factors determining turnover (i.e: macroeconomic conditions dictating quitting or firing) 
affect formal and informal jobs in a similar fashion. The non-employment sectors also 
reveal the patterns now standard in the mainstream literature and in Mexico: duration of 
unemployment moves countercyclically reflecting the ease of finding jobs during 
upturns, while duration in OLF is procyclical, likely reflecting voluntary inactivity.
13
 
                                                 
12 See Bosch and Maloney (2005) 
13 Our findings are consistent with those of Flinn and Heckman (1983) for the US that, in Brazil as well, 
OLF and unemployment are distinct labor market states. 
  11  These changes in duration correspond, of course, to swings in separation and 
transition rates and here again we find great similarities in behavior across the sectors. 
The probabilities of transiting between formality and the two sectors of informality 
(Figure 5) suggest pro-cyclical patterns of job allocation across all sectors of employment 
and the movements are highly correlated within pairs of bilateral flows, especially in the 
case of self-employment and formality: the de-trended series of S-F and F-S transition 
rates, and I-F and F-I transition rates show correlations of 0.84 and 0.44 respectively. 
These patterns correspond closely to the pro-cyclical patterns in job-to-job flows 
observed in U.S. literature on job-to-job flows (Shimer 2005c) that are generally 
attributed to workers finding better jobs in tighter job markets, or when workers are 
involuntarily separated in the normal churning process but find another before entering 
the unemployment pool. They are less consistent with the informal sector being the 
disadvantaged sector in a segmented labor market which would imply negative 
correlation between these flows across the business cycle. That said, again, the raw series 
suggest a structural change occurring, in the early 1990s. Flows between SE to F diverge 
with F to SE staying high and the reverse falling.  The comovements among F and I 
broadly reverse sign across the same period.   
 
  Figures 6a show the flows from each of the employment sectors into 
unemployment and inactivity. For all sectors, as found for the US by Blanchard and 
Diamond (1991) and Hall (2005), flows into inactivity are pro-cyclical whereas flows 
into unemployment are clearly countercyclical and dramatically so during the 1983 and 
1999 crisis.  That said, consistent with Mexico, formal separations are relatively invariant 
while the informal show the largest volatility in separations, perhaps reflecting the risk 
attending informal micro enterprises and the necessary adjustments via quantities to cope 
with economic fluctuations. But it is not the case that the informal sectors are playing the 
role of disguised unemployment.  Table 5 shows that the correlation of the HP de-trended 
flows from formality into unemployment, informal salaried and self employed work with 
respect to unemployment rate are 0.10 and -0.19 and -0.56 respectively suggesting very 
different motivations for entry. 
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  Figure 6b suggests a mirroring asymmetry: the job finding rate in the formal 
sector is highly pro-cyclical and very volatile (see Table 5). This is also true for the job 
finding rate from inactivity. However, the job finding rate in the informal sector although 
noisy is reasonably constant, including during the crisis.   
 
  To summarize, the broad patterns of duration, transitions among sectors and into 
and out of unemployment are all suggestive that the three sectors of work are far more 
similar than they are distinct.  The flows among them are far closer to the salaried sectors 
observed in the US with the informal sector providing competing options rather than a 
traditional segmentation view.  The different cyclical volatilities of entry and exit with 
respect to unemployment, also found in Mexico, do have important resonance with the 
debate in the mainstream literature (see Bosch and Maloney 2005) over labor market 
functioning and, in addition are critical to how the labor market adjusts to shocks.  
 
V. Accounting for Changes in Unemployment and Sectoral Shares with 
Gross Flows  
  
  Much of the motivation of the analogous US literature has been the desire to 
understand how much of changes in unemployment rates are driven by changes in job-
finding, job separation and job reallocation probabilities.  We have the same general 
interest in developing countries, but in addition, would like to understand the dynamics 
underlying the secular movements in sectoral shares discussed above. We follow 
Shimer’s (2005a) strategy of isolating the impact of a given type of gross flows on the 
aggregate sector sizes by using the generated instantaneous transition probabilities to 
construct the predicted steady state values of our five possible states for each period. We 
then compute the size of the sector that would result if we allow one particular transition 
to vary and leave all the other transitions constant at their average values during the 
period (see Annex 2). 
  
  13 
Unemployment 
  The upper and lower panels of Figure 7a show the impact of changes of flows into 
and out of unemployment and the formal sector on their respective sector sizes.  Two 
points merit attention. First, Figure 7a suggests that flows from OLF into unemployment 
(lower panel) appear to have an inordinate explanatory power until the early 1990s and 
maintain a contribution across the entire sample. This is somewhat distinct from the 
Mexican case where flows from the informal sectors into unemployment were dominant 
drivers of the size of the sector.  Second, consistent with the discussion above, reduced 
accessions to formality appear to be the most important factor on the outflows side.  But 
again, there is some difficulty in teasing out cyclical from secular effects.  The sharp rise 
in unemployment during the 1998 reception seems a combination of a substantial, but not 
unprecedented increase in flows into the labor force from inactivity layered on a secular 
decrease in the ability to get formal and informal salaried jobs.   
 
Formality 
Until the early 1990s, fluctuations in the size of the formal sector were more than 
accounted for by procyclical changes in flows into the sector, which were partially offset 
by the procyclical movements in separations: That is, in downturns fewer people quit, but 
even fewer were able to get jobs. (Figure 7b) This is consistent with the findings for 
salaried employment in the US, and with the general story from Mexico about how LDC 
labor markets adjust to adverse shocks. During the 1983-85 crisis, flows into formal 
employment from all sectors and unemployment (Figure 7b) fell dramatically, leaving the 
informal sectors, which show more constant hiring rates during the crisis, to account for a 
rising share of workers. In a sense then, as Bosch and Maloney (2006) note for Mexico, 
the informal sectors serve the role of a shock absorber of a sort, just not in the traditional 
sense of an immediate destination for separated formal workers. But it is important to 
highlight that during the recovery, transitions into informality from formal work rise as 
do transitions into informal salaried work from unemployment.  The upturn provides new 
  14opportunities in the small firm sector with the attractions that independence and possibly 
better money it offers.   
 
  The upper and lower panels of Figure 7b document a break in the determinants in 
the size of the formal sector beginning in the early 1990s driven by two important 
innovations.  First, the flows into formal employment from other sectors during the 1995-
1998 recovery did not increase in anywhere near the same magnitudes that they did in the 
1986-1990 recovery.  Second, formal separations to all sectors, which previously behaved 
in a procyclical fashion that, as mentioned above, offset the forces driving the sector’s 
procyclical evolution, now appear to reinforce them. The reduction in flows from All to 
F, and in particular from S.E. & I, explains the majority of the decline in the size of the 
formal sector from 1990 on, with the remainder explained by the now secularly 
increasing separation rate. This finding of the importance of the reduction in formal 
hiring may partly explain why Paes de Barros and Corsueil (2001), focusing exclusively 
on separations, found no impact of the Constitution on the informal sector. The task in 
the next section is to isolate what drove these changes in gross flows, and in particular the 
fall in hiring rates. 
 
 
VI. Constitutional Change or Trade Reforms? Determination of the 
Dynamics and Size of the Formal Sector 
 
  As discussed above, the trade and constitutional reforms have received the most 
attention in explaining the observed increase in informality and, to the degree possible we 
will attempt to explain the changes in gross labor flows with proxies for these reforms. 
 
Trade Liberalization: We employ two proxies for the liberalization of the trade regime, 
Muendler’s (2002) import penetration ratio, and Kume et al.’s (2003) real effective trade 
protection rates,
 both measured by industrial sector for the period 1987-1998. Data is 
drawn from Pinheiro and Bacha de Almeida (1994) to complete both series for the period 
1983-1986 and from Nassif and Pimentel (2004) to complete the import penetration 
series up to 2002. Effective protection is preferred to nominal tariffs as before 1988 non-
  15tariff barriers implied that most tariffs were redundant, that is the tariffs exceeded the 
differential between internal and external prices (see Hay 2001 and Kume et. al. 2003).  
We assume that individual firms take these changes as exogenous and hence use the 
complete series. Since our interest in the end, is to identify the maximum contributions of 
trade variables to the evolution of the dependent variables, rather than identify individual 
effects, we include both variables simultaneously despite some clear conceptual overlap. 
Figure 8 shows the dramatic effects of reforms: a reduction to one-third of the level of 
effective protection (from 1988 to 2002) and doubing of import penetration rates (during 
the same period). This, along with the fact that higher reductions in the formal hiring 
rates observed in diverse industries (see Figure 9) appear accompanied by higher import 
penetration ratios
14 suggests that trade liberalization may have been important.  
 
  We develop three proxies to capture the impact of elements of the Constitutional 
reforms discussed in the introduction. Unlike the trade variables, we do not have a 
continuous series of arguably exogenous innovations across time, but rather a reform 
implemented at one moment.
15  Hence, we are especially dependent on the cross 
sectional variation in the impact of the reforms for identification.  We calculate pre-
reform values for formal workers by sector and then interact them with a dummy for the 
Constitution.  This effectively exploits the cross sectional impact of the reforms across 
several dimensions.   
    
Union density: As discussed above, the reforms generally shifted power toward the 
unions and hence we would expect sectors with greater union representation to be more 
affected. The National Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de 
Domicílios
16 PNAD), a complementary employment survey with greater coverage but no 
                                                 
14 The relation between changes in hiring rates and effective protection seems to be orthogonal before 
controlling for any other effect. 
15 Impacts of Constitutional changes appear to be of different magnitude for formal and informal workers. 
For instance, Figure 8 shows a differentiated evolution of the aggregate incidence of overtime and of the 
tenure of workers before dismissal between both sectors. Nevertheless the time variation of the proxies can 
certainly be treated as exogenous and attributed to the Constitutional change just for the periods in the 
neighborhood of 1988.  
16 Data to compute the union density by industrial sector and to identify the sources of provision of health 
services before reforms was drawn from this source. 
  16panel dimension, asks workers if they are affiliated with a union and from this we 
calculate density by industrial sector over all years where the variable is tabulated (1986, 
1988 for the pre constitutional change period and 1992 to 1999, but 1994 for the 
remainder).  As in Saba (2001), we restrict the sample to individuals of 18 to 65 years of 
age, economically active in the formal sector, and earning a positive wage.  
 
Firing Costs:  The Constitutional reform raised the penalty on employers upon firing a 
worker from 10% to 40% of the mandatory workers separation account, the FGTS, the 
accumulation of which, in turn, is a function of tenure.  In the spirit of Gonzaga (2003) 
and Heckman and Pages (2000), we propose that sectors with longer tenure at firing 
would find the Constitutional change more onerous and approximate firing costs by 
average tenure (in years).  The PME asks fired workers about their tenure in the previous 
job and we, again, aggregate to get a measure of tenure by industry.    
 
Overtime: The Constitution reduced the legal limit from 48 to 44 hours per week.  We 
expect that industries with a larger share of the of the work force working more than the 
new legal limit, as reported by the PME, would face the largest adjustments.   
 
In all three cases, we fix the values to the average observed before the 
constitutional change in order to be sure that the cross sectional variation is not 
endogenously driven after the constitutional change.  Figure 9 depicts in scatter plot the 
relationship between the changes of formal hiring rates (before and after 1988) and the 
level of each of our proxies for the different industrial sectors and shows that, 
unconditionally, higher reductions in formal hiring rates are coupled with higher values 
of labor costs, of firing costs and of unionization.  
 
  We estimate four specifications in which the dependent variable is either the 
creation rate of formal jobs (inflows to formal from all other sectors), the destruction rate 
of formal jobs (outflows from formal to unemployment sector), the size of the formal 
sector, and what Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) call “industry formality differentials” –
  17differentials conditioned on worker characteristics.
17  We confirm Goldberg and 
Pavcnik’s (2003) findings that the vast majority (88%) of the change in informality takes 
place within sectors and hence seek identification off the variation in the impact of 
reforms across sectors. 
 
  All the dependent variables are computed yearly for each of the 18 industries
18 
from 1983-2002, based on the PME and are defined above. The yearly destruction and 
creation rates are pooled instantaneous transitions computed using monthly data 
following the procedure of Geweke et. al. (1986) outlined in Annex 2. The formal sector 
size and the industry differentials corresponds to annual averages computed using the 
monthly inputs from the PME .  The latter were obtained following Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003).
 19   
 
Our core specification is  
 
  jt CC D j TRADE jt t j jt u CC D TRADE Y + + + + = . * β β α α  
 
where   represents one of four dependent variables,  jt Y j α  and  t α  represents the industry 
and year fixed effects respectively.  jt TRADE  is a vector containing both effective tariffs 
                                                 
17Industry differentials come from the following model:   where   is 
an indicator for whether a worker i employed in industry j at time t works in the formal sector,   is a 
vector of worker characteristics: gender, age, age
ijt jt ijt Ht ijt ijt F INDDIF I H F ε β + + = _ ijt F
ijt H
2, education indicators (primary, secondary, superior) with 
associated coefficients 
Ht β  and    is a set of industry indicators (determining worker i’s industry 
affiliation) with associated coefficients   (industry formality differentials) 
ijt I
jt F INDDIF _
18 Non Metallic, Metallic, Mechanical, Electrical, Transport, Furniture, Paper, Rubber, Leather, Chemicals, 
Petroleum, Personal Care, Plastic, Textile, Apparel, Food, Beverage, Tobacco (see Table 2). 
19 Following Goldberg and Pavcnik, we first use a linear probability model to regress the informal dummy 
indicator on a vector of worker characteristics and on a set of industry indicators representing the workers’ 
industry affiliation. The coefficients on industry indicators can be considered “industry informality 
differentials” stripped of worker characteristics which are then pooled over time and regressed on trade 
related industry characteristics using industry fixed effects and in first differences specifications. Their 
results are based on Brazilian PME and on Colombian National Household Survey. In the first case they 
suggest that there is no statistical relationship between industry’s exposure to trade and probability of 
working in the informal sector, in the second, they report that tariffs’ declines are associated with an 
increase in informal employment prior to labor market reforms and suggest that compared to labor market 
rigidities, trade policy is of secondary importance in determining the incidence of informality. 
  18and imports penetration and  j CC D*  is a vector of the constitutional variables interacted 
with a dummy variable capturing the constitutional change of 1988. Again, though, in 
theory, the two trade variables should be capturing similar things, since we are more 
interested in “soaking up” as much explanatory power from the trade liberalization that 
might be correlated with the constitutional variables than identifying the specific effect of 
an individual variable, we include them both.   
 
We begin with five preliminary univariate specifications to explore the 
explanatory power of each of the component variables individually and then with the 
static specification above.  Finally, because we expect that reforms may not work through 
the labor market instantaneously, we include two lags of all variables and then proceed to 
more parsimonious specifications.  
 
  Preliminary analysis of the data reveals substantial trending in the variables 
suggesting that the above specifications may yield spurious results. However, Levin Lin 
Chu (2002) panel unit roots tests reject non-stationarity in the residuals of the non-
dynamic levels specification suggesting that we can treat it as capturing a cointegrating 
relationship. However, as a robustness check, we also estimate a pooled first difference 
estimator. All specifications are estimated using Cross Section Weighted Least Squares 




Table 6 reports the estimation of the univariate and static specifications. Although 
these are very preliminary models, they generate two suggestive findings. First, the 
postulated explanatory variables appear most statistically significant in explaining job 
creation, somewhat less sector size and industry differential, and finally very little of job 
destruction. Second, both sets of variables appear to have explanatory power for all 
dependent variables, albeit to greater or lesser degree.    
 
  19Results of our preferred specification (in levels) are reported in Table 7a. 
Introducing dynamics improves the specifications which appear overall well specified, 
with most variables entering significantly. Since the trade variables never enter 
significantly beyond the contemporaneous, we dropped dynamic terms for them, The 
difference specifications in Table 7b are very similar though generally showing lower 
levels of significance. The negative autoregressive terms in the latter suggest over-
differentiation lending support to the appropriateness of the levels specification.
20  
   
Trade openness, and in particular, import penetration enters significantly and of 
predicted sign in all specifications with the exception of job destruction. This is 
consistent with Goldberg and Pavcnik’s findings for Colombia, although it conflicts with 
those for Brazil where they found no effect of import penetration, albeit with very 
different specifications.   
 
The proxies for constitutional change also emerge as significant and generally of 
predicted sign with, again, the least satisfactory results appearing in job destruction.   
With the exception of a non significant impact on job separations, tenure enters of 
predicted overall effect in the industry differentials and creation specifications.  The 
positive contemporaneous value swamps the expected sign on the first lag in the sector 
size specifications to leave an overall unexpected sign.  Overtime enters as predicted in 
all specifications with the exception of destruction where it enters negatively.  Union 
power enters strongly significantly as a negative factor in job creation and a positive 
factor in destruction, and less significantly, but still of similar effect in industry 
differentials.  The strongly positive effect on sector size, while perhaps not unintuitive in 
itself, nonetheless suggests a different dynamic than the other specifications.   
 
                                                 
20 It provides useful information besides to help to check consistency of the specifications in levels. For 
example, although the regression to explain formal job destruction in levels proved to fit the explained 
variable with a high degree of adjustment, its specification in difference showed to have a poor adjustment 
and be mainly driven by the AR process of the dependent, reinforcing in some sense the results found by 
Paes de Barros. This does not occur with the model of job creation that proved also to be consistent and not 
mainly driven by the AR process in the specification in differences. 
 
  20These results are somewhat at odds with Paes de Barros and Corseuil (2001) who 
found no impact of constitutional proxies on labor demand, although since they employ a 
manufacturing survey that cannot separate formal and informal workers the way that it is 
done here, 
21  to the degree that the sampled firms may simply be hiring the same number 
of workers, but granting fewer signed work cards, the results could be consistent with our 
findings.  However, perhaps more consistent with their inability to explain job destruction 
rates, these are our least satisfactory specifications.  Paes de Barros and Corseuil also use 
the PME in a difference in differences analysis of hazard rates of the termination of 
formal employment in the next month conditioned on current duration. In this sense, they 
are examining a very similar phenomenon to our separation rates.
22 They get ambiguous 
results in the hazard and transition intensities rates out of employment finding that 
separation rates have decreased after the constitutional changes for the short employment 
spells and increased for longer spells.
23 The finding that resolves both Paes de Barros and 
Corseuil and our weak modeling of job destruction, with our reasonably strong modeling 
of sector size and industry differentials are the the strong specifications for job creation.  
Here, all explanatory variables enter of expected sign and of a high degree of 
significance.      
 
The difference specifications are broadly consistent although the negative 
autoregressive terms suggest that, in fact, we may be over differencing. Trade protection 
has similar signs although here effective rates of protection are the most important (only 
                                                 
21  The sample also differs in not covering firms of under 5 workers and in a different spatial coverage than 
the PME. They generate their finding by running the coefficients from monthly estimates of the   
autoregressive  term and the short run elasticity  with respect to wages on  an indicator for the constitutional 
change and controlling for a set of basic macroeconomic variables. 
22 Although they identify two additional possible sources of cross sectional variation (quits versus layoffs 
and short versus long employment spells), the formal-informal partition of the worker population 
constitutes the preferred alternative of treatment (formal) and control (informal) groups. 
23 When they regress monthly estimates for the aggregated hazard rate on an indicator for the constitutional 
change, an indicator for the group (treatment and control), a set of macroeconomic indicators and 
interactions between the group indicator and each of the macroeconomic indicators and also on the 
constitution indicator, they do not find evidence of any effect of the constitution change on the informal 
sector. For some cases, they observe that differences between the formal sector’s turnover variation (pre 
and post the constitutional change) and the informal workers’ turnover variation are positive for some 
spells and negative for others. For example, for the shortest spell (duration of employment less that 3 
months) they found that the turnover variation in the informal workers was greater than in the formal cases, 
lower for the intermediate spell (duration of employment between 3 and 12 months) and almost equal for 
the longest spell (duration of employment between one and two years). 
  21for industry differentials and creation) and import penetration is not.  Both union power 
and overtime enter as negative factors in size and creation and a contributor to destruction 
in all specifications and significantly.  Tenure enters somewhat counter-intuitively in all 
differenced specifications.  
 
Figure 10 attempts to quantify the relative contribution of these determinants by 
presenting simulations based on the estimated coefficients of the levels specification for 
creation, destruction, and formal sector size. Overall, the fitted values capture the 
evolution of these series reasonably well. We then examine the impact of trade 
liberalization by holding the trade variables at their initial values and using the model to 
simulate the evolution of formality.  Although the impact on destruction is meager, the 
impact on job creation between 1990 and 2002 is important: job creation would have 
been higher by 5 percentage points, or about 20% of the total change in job creation. 
 
We repeat this exercise but this time suppressing the effects of our proxies for 
constitutional change. We find that with no constitutional changes, the job creation rate 
would have maintained a constant average of roughly 70% (i.e. two times its value at the 
end of the 1990s) while the destruction rate would have increased only in 0.5 percentage 
points. Hence, the impact of the reforms comes virtually entirely through an impact on 
hiring rates in the formal sector.  
 
We approach measuring the impact on sector size in two ways. The first is to 
repeat the above exercise with the coefficients from the aggregate regression on size. In 
fact, the lower panel of Figure 10 suggests that the reform covariates explain little with 
most predictive power coming through the time dummies. Formal sector size would have 
been 3 percentage points or 4% higher in the absence of trade liberalization with the 
constitution contributing modestly.   
 
However, the first two panels of Figure 11 suggest that, in fact the reform 
covariates were very important to the trajectories of job creation and destruction leading 
to far less creation and, in the case of the Constitution, far less destruction. Hence, our 
  22second approach follows Shimer and simulates what the changing creation and 
destruction rates imply for the steady state level of formality in the same way as was done 
in Figure 7. Figure 11 suggests that the impacts of the reforms were now quite large.
24  
There is a modest contribution of trade variables (3 percentage points or 21% of the 
reduction in formality), but a large impact of the constitutional changes (13 percentage 
points or 76% of the reduction in formality).  The second panel suggests that the net 
effect of the Constitution was so large precisely because reduced creation, which the 
Constitutional reforms impacted negatively, had much larger impact on overall size than 
destruction which the Constitution generally reduced.   
 
Other possible explanations 
 
In the simulations above, the trade variables explain under 5% of the secular 
movements in informality. The remainder is driven largely by discrete indicator variables 
interacted with cross sectional variation in constitutional proxies.  Ideally, we might have 
more time series variation that could concretely rule out other possible phenomena not 
related to labor market legislation. We briefly review two possible candidates.     
 
First, along with the Constitutional reforms affecting labor markets were 
initiatives changing the nature of health system implemented in the early 1990s that 
granted universal access to health services.
    25  Carneiro and Henley (2003) suggest that 
                                                 




f = . Notice also 
that to perform this simulation, we use as a destruction rate the probability of transiting from the formal to 
all non formal sectors (not just only employment) 
 
25 See Annex 3 for details. Among the changes contemplated in the Social Security System Reform of 1991 
(which comprises pensions, health, and social aid), health related amendments are the only candidates to be 
considered as possibly determinants. Although pensions reforms loosened the requirements to perceive a 
pension (age for elegibility and required years of services were lowered) and increased the benefits of 
recipients (see de Carvalho 2002 for a summary of the characteristics of the Brazilian security system 
before and after the reform), two reasons reduce its suitability to explain the composition and dynamics of 
the labor market: first, benefits are computed as a function of documented past earnings over the cumulated 
time of services except for those perceiving the minimum pensions hence in any of those cases there is no 
incentive for workers to move between formality or informality because of potential gains in switching due 
to pensions; second, the reforms should have exerted more effects over the elder population close to 
retirement which is not the critic mass driving the size and dynamics of the labor sectors. 
  23uncovered employment may have risen because employees and employers collude to 
avoid costly contributions to a social protection system that is perceived to be 
inappropriate, inefficient and poor value for the money.
26 In principle, then, a 
universalization of health care de-linked from the labor market may have changed the 
cost benefit analysis of being enrolled in, and hence contributing to, formal sector 
benefits programs. In the end, they conclude that this is unlikely, not only because public 
health services continued to be thought of as substantially worse than the formal sector 
product, 
27 but also because the effective supply of these services was available even for 
non contributors several years before the reforms took place (see Table 8), and little 
progress had been made on implementing the measures contemplated in the 1991 Social 
Security Reform.   
 
Second, there was an increase in the magnitude of flows from the rural to the 
urban areas across the 1990s that, in principle, were it all directed toward the informal 
sector, might explain part of the rise.
28  Two facts lead us to discard this hypothesis. First, 
while there was a decrease in the size of the rural sector relative to the urban across the 
period, the population growth of the “metropolitan” areas that the PME is representative 
of (see Table 9) was roughly equivalent to that observed in non-metropolitan areas.   
Hence, there cannot have been substantial net migration into our sample.
29 This is 
consistent with the fact that the average schooling of informal workers increased 
significantly over the nineties and the schooling gap between formal and informal 
                                                 
26 Their estimates suggest that the earnings premium needed in the marketplace to compensate covered 
workers for having to make social security contributions varies between 7.5% and 12.2% of the mean 
uncovered hourly wage. 
27 The public system acts as a floor, available to all but used primarily by the lower classes (Jack 2000). 
Although evaluation of standards for minimum quality in infrastructure, human resources, ethical, technical 
and scientific procedures in hospitals have been implemented, these practices are far from being universal 
in the services network (PAHO 2005) 
28 See Ramos and Ferreira (2005ab) for a comprehensive description of the regional patterns of the 
Brazilian workforce. 
29 Even if all of the rural workforce contraction observed during the nineties would have been a 
consequence of emigration towards urban zones, it would have only explained 13% of the increase of the 
urban’s workforce (or 19% of the increase in the urban informal workforce under the assumption that all 
the rural incoming workers inserted to this sector exclusively). The size of the urban and rural workforce 
(as well as of the metropolitan and non metropolitan ones) and the size of the formal/informal sectors are 
computed using the PNAD. This survey covers urban and rural areas of the whole country except for the 
rural areas of the Northern Region (which comprises the following Unidades da Federação: Rondônia, 
Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá).   
  24workers also decreased substantially suggesting that these are not poorer immigrants 
from the countryside entering the metropolitan workforce. In fact, Curi and Menezes 
Filho (2006) show that formal-informal transitions have been more intensive among more 
qualified workers. Second, ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of unskilled workers 
in metropolitan areas should have translated into reducing relative informal/formal wages 
and Figure 12 suggests that this was not the case.  
 
In fact, Figure 12 also suggests that for roughly the period 1994-1997, the 
expansion of informality was accompanied by a rise in informal earnings relative to the 
formal sector
30. Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney (2006) find this is correlated with an 
appreciation of the exchange rate and consistent with a demand shock to the informal 
(nontradable) sector that raised both demand for workers and earnings in the sector.  That 
is, part of the rise in informality is due to a normal reallocation of workers to a sector that 
is intrinsically informal.   However, on either side of this interval, the behavior appears to 
suggest increasing segmentation accompanying the rise in the sector size which is 
consistent with the story we’re discussing here.   
 
VII. Conclusions   
 
This paper has sought to explain the evolution of the Brazilian labor market, and 
in particular, the expanding informal sector, through the lens of gross labor flows.  It 
shows that the dynamics of the formal salaried sector in Brazil correspond closely to 
those established in Mexico and to those found by Shimer for the United States of 
relatively constant job separation rates, but varying job finding rates. As in Mexico, the 
informal sector shows more constant hiring rates across the cycle, consistent with a 
greater degree of wage flexibility.  These findings confirm for Brazil, Bosch and 
Maloney’s view of the adjustment of LDC labor markets across the cycle that has 
elements of the traditional view of informality across the crisis, but perhaps with an 
updated mechanism, and without a connotation of overall inferiority of the sector. 
                                                 
30 Ulyssea (2006) shows that the gap between the gross wage of formal and informal workers has fallen 
from 1995-2005 nevertheless the opposite can be said about the controlled (by workers characteristics) 
wage gap. 
  25Transitions among all sectors, formal and informal, are broadly pro-cyclical and highly 
correlated to each other, providing some of the strongest evidence that most transitions 
into informality correspond to job-to-job transitions in the mainstream literature, and less 
to disguised unemployment.  This is consistent with motivational responses of workers 
entering informal self employment in the PNAD that over 62% of the sector stated that 
they did not want a formal job.  However, during downturns, the formal salaried sector 
stops creating new jobs, as is the case in the United States and Mexico, but, net, the 
informal sector does not.    
 
However, the secular 10 percentage point contraction of formal employment 
across the 1990s suggests other forces at play.  We establish that trade liberalization 
played a relatively small part in this increase, but find suggestive evidence that several 
dimensions of the Constitutional reform, in particular, regulations relating to firing costs, 
overtime, and union power, explain much more.  Both effects work mostly through the 
reduction in hiring rates, rather than separation rates that have been investigated in the 
literature to date.  Overall, the findings confirm the importance of labor legislation to 
firms’ decisions to create new formal sector jobs in Brazil.     
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  31Annex 1. Estimation of Continuous Time Transition Probabilities 
 
We calculate the transition probabilities across sectors by assuming that the 
observed discrete-time mobility process is generated by a continuous-time homogeneous 
Markov process Xt defined over a discrete state-space E ={1,….K} where K is the number 
of possible states (job sectors) a worker could be found in.  The worker if observed at 
equally distanced points of time. Starting from the discrete tabulations, one can construct 
a discrete time transition matrix P(t,t+n) where 
 
i t X j n t X n t t pij = = + = + ) ( | ) ( Pr( ) , (  for  ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 = t and  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = n  
 
being   the probability of moving from state i to state j in one step (n). Discrete 
time matrices are easily straight forward to compute as the maximum likelihood estimator 
for   is  , being  the total number of transitions from state i to state j and 
the total number of observations initially in state i. As   , this gives rise to a  kxk 
transition intensity matrix Q where  
ij p
ij p i ij ij n n p / = ij n









whose solution is given by: 
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Thus,   elements can be interpreted as the instantaneous rates (hazard rates) of 
transition from state i to state j. These must be seen as reduced form estimates combining 
both the disposition of workers to move to a different state as well as the available 
“spaces” in that state: a workers desire to take a certain job and the availability of that 
job,  quits and fires etc.  
ij q
 
  32In practice, the estimation of the continuous time transition matrix form is subject 
to two major difficulties.  First of all, solution to equation 2 may not be unique. This is 
known as the aliasing problem.  That is, it is possible for an observed discrete time matrix 
to have been generated by more than one underlying continuous matrix. On the other 
hand it is possible that none of the solutions obtained for Q is compatible with the 
theoretical model expressed in equation 1 where the elements of Q have to satisfy the set 
of restrictions captured in equation 3. This is known as the embeddability problem.  
 
We follow Geweke et al. (1986) approach that proposes a Bayesian procedure for 
statistical inference on intensity matrices as well as any function of the estimated 
parameters by using a uniform diffuse prior which allows establishing the probability of 
embeddability of the discrete-time matrix
31. The method consists of drawing a large 
number of discrete time matrices from a previously defined “importance function,” 
assessing their embeddability and constructing confidence intervals of the parameters or 
functions of interests using only the posterior distribution of those matrices that turn out 
to be embeddable.  This also provides a very natural way of assessing the probability of 
embeddability as the proportion of the embeddable draws.
32  
                                                 
31 Additional useful inferences can be obtained from estimation of the intensity matrix. For instance, 
duration times in state i can be shown to be distributed exponentially  , allowing us to 
retrieve the mean duration time en each sector as  1 
) exp( ~ ii i q d −
) (
− − = ii i q d E
32 The probability of embeddability of all instantaneous transition matrices is in the range between 1 and 
0.98 
  33Annex 2. Identifying the drivers of the steady state shares 
 
Following Shimer (2005a) we construct the predicted steady state values of our 
five possible states for each period using the instantaneous transition probabilities 
generated above by solving 
sf if uf of fs fi fu fo
fs is us os sf si us os
fi si ui oi if is ui oi
fu su iu ou uf us ui uo
of so io uo of os oi ou
sq iq uq oq q q q q f
fq iq uq oq q q q q s
fq sq uq oq q q q q i
fq sq iq oq q q q q u
fq sq iq uq q q q q o
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +








and adjusting the resulting stocks so the corresponding shares sum to unity.  Here, 
q is the discrete probability of transition calculated in the immediately previous period 
and where o, u, i, s and f are the number of inactive, unemployed self employed, informal 
salaried and formal salaried workers. Following Shimer (2005a), we then compute the 
size of the sector that would result if we allow one particular transition to vary (i.e. 
transitions from formal salaried work into unemployment) and leave all the other 
transitions constant at their average values during the period. This allows us to isolate the 
impact of a given type of gross flows on the aggregate sector sizes. 
  34Annex 3. Brazilian Health Care System 
 




Extended coverage of health care was not exclusive of the post 1988 Constitution 
ages in Brazil. Lobato and Burlandy (2000) points out that from the 1970s on, social 
security coverage was extended to workers who previously had none, but benefits 
continued to be linked to contributions. In addition, emergency care was expanded to 
cover the whole population, independent of an individual’s affiliation with social 
security. This provoked an unprecedented increase in the demand for services. The 
Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (INAMPS, national 
institute of medical care and social security), contracted more and more often with third 
parties to care for the increasing clientele. This gave the private sector a progressively 
more important role in service provision. As a result, the publicly owned network shrank 
and deteriorated. By 1976, for example, only 27% of all hospital beds were public, while 
73% belonged to the private sector.  
 
With the intention to decentralize and universalize the provision of health 
services, several reforms were introduced. Succinctly, the transformation of the Brazilian 
Health system occurred in three phases
33
 
Phase Year  Law  Actions 
1. Integrated Health 
Actions (Acoes 
Integradas de Saude 
– AIS) 




AIS shifted some supply to under-utilized 
public hospitals, and coordinated the 
functions of INAMPS with the Ministry of 
Health 





Saúde – SUDS)  








SUDS led to a transfer of INAMPS staff 
and facilities to state health secretariats, 
with the central agency acting solely as a 
funding conduit (and being renamed the 
INSS - Instituto Nacional de Segurança 
Social). Decentralisation became more 
complete as state and municipal health 
secretariats assumed control of staff and 
facilities. 
3. Single Health 
System (Sistema 






Lei Orgânica da 
While the SUS in many ways continues the 
efforts to decentralise the system as 
provided in the first two phases of health 
                                                 
33 Chenani et. al. (2003), Jack (2000) 








“Sistema Nacional de 
Seguridade Social” 
SNSS: Laws 8212 
and 8213 
reform, several measures reflect a partial 
re-centralisation of federal authority
34. In 
1993 INAMPS was abolished and 
integrated into the Ministry of Health 
under the umbrella of the SAS, Secretaria 
de Açoes de Saúde. The main function of 
the SAS is to transfer funds to state health 
secretariats. 
 
Nevertheless, neither decentralization nor universalization were accomplished 
after these reforms: by 1997, less than 3% of the municipalities qualified for complete 
decentralization and management of health services (Martinez 1999); by 2001, while 
89.06% of the municipalities qualified to provide basic attention only 10.14% qualified 





Breaking the link between benefits and contributions jeopardized the public health 
system. Normatively, 1988 Constitution determined that SUS should be financed from: 
 
-  The social security budget which is funded trough salary based compulsory 
contributions by employers (incidents sobre folha de salaries –i.e. payroll checks-
, sobre o faturamento – i.e. on gross profit - e sobre o lucro liquido das empresas 
– i.e. on net profits) and employees; 
-  General taxation through federal, state and municipal budgets 
-  Other sources 
 
Positively however, because neither the Constitution nor the social security 
budget specified the amount of resources designated for health, the budget directives law 
(Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias) fixed a minimum equal to 30% of the social security 
budget. This minimum has not been met, however, since 1993, when the Social Security 
Institute suspended the transfer of resources to the Ministry of Health. This caused a deep 
financial crisis in the sector. In 1992, for instance, resources from compulsory 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 Harmeling (1999) 
35 For a comprehensive analysis refer to Reis, Ribeiro and Piola (2001). 
  36contributions represented 55% of the public budget for health. From 1993 on, SUS began 
to rely upon extraordinary contributions and central government transfers to make up its 
budget, which amounted to 60% of its total resources in 1995. A special tax on banking 
transactions was imposed in 1996 to solve the problem. On the other hand, states and 
municipalities increased the allocation of their own resources to finance the system 
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Table 1. Shares of the five employment sectors: 1983, 1989 and 2002 
 
Jan-83 Dec-89 Nov-02
Out of the Labor Force 38.74 39.40 43.53
Unemployed 3.86 1.41 4.02
Informal Self Employed 11.62 12.95 13.80
Informal Salaried 9.15 7.69 10.54
Formal Sector 35.74 37.98 27.67
Unassigned 0.89 0.55 0.44
 




Table 2. Effective Protection and Import Penetration before and after the Trade 
Reforms 
Industry
1983 1990 1998 1983 1990 2002
Nonmetallic Mineral Goods -19.6 38.8 15.4 0.8 1.3 3.8
Metallic Mineral Goods 34.2 15.8 14.2 1.5 2.4 4.9
Machinery and Equipment 93.3 41.5 18.6 8.8 7.3 20.1
Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Components 129.3 62.5 24.5 14.5 13.7 24.5
Vehicle and Vehicle Parts -6.5 351.1 129.2 8.2 9.1 13.5
Wood Sawing, Wood Products and Furniture 35.2 29.4 15.1 0.5 0.4 2.3
Paper Manufacturing, Publishing and Printing 6.7 22.6 14.7 1.7 2.5 4.3
Rubber -21.4 70.2 16 2.3 4.9 16.0
Non petrochemical Chemicals 86.4 25.2 24.2 8.4 12.8 17.4
Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical 62.9 38.5 5.7 3.8 3.8 8.8
Pharmaceutical Products, Perfumes and Detergents 103.95 35.8 10 1.9 6.7 12.4
Plastics 28.3 50.7 21.9 1.8 2.2 11.5
Textiles 36.7 49.2 24.9 1.1 2.8 10.1
Apparel and apparel accessories 46.7 67 26.1 0.3 0.5 2.0
Footwear and Leather and Hide Products 30.3 28.8 19.4 1.7 4.4 7.0
Plant Product Processing (including tobacco) 5.7 30.6 15.4 0.1 3.3 1.6
Food 26.1 80.6 20.8 0.9 2.1 2.7
Beverages -1.1 94.5 24.1 2.6 2.9 3.1
Import Penetration Ratio Effective Protection Rate
 
Source: Effective Protection rates come from Pinheiro and Bacha de Almeida (1994) for 1983 and from 
Kume et al. (2003) for 1990 and 1998. Import Penetration Ratios come from Pinheiro and Bacha de 
Almeida (1994) for 1983, from Muendler (2002) for 1990 and from Nassif and Pimentel (2004) for 2002. 
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Table 3. Characteristics of employed workers: 1983, 1989 and 2002 
 
Age School Hours Wage
Jan-83
Informal Self Employed 40.08          5.34            38.56          0.76
Informal Salaried 29.89          4.89            42.44          0.29
Formal Sector 32.39          7.17            39.59          1.00
Dec-89
Informal Self Employed 40.29          6.17            39.19          1.00
Informal Salaried 30.33        5.54          41.09        0.40
Formal Sector 32.99          7.67            38.69          1.00
Nov-02
Informal Self Employed 42.06          8.18            40.98          1.06
Informal Salaried 33.72          8.09            40.46          0.59
Formal Sector 35.63          9.68            40.87          1.00
 
Author’s calculations using the PME. The table shows the mean age, years 
of schooling (school) weekly hours of work (Hours) and the relative 
average wage with respect to the formal sector.  
  39Table 4. Pooled continuous time intensity matrix 1983-2002 
O.L.F. U S.E. I F
O.L.F. (0.1015)        0.0343          0.0314          0.0244          0.0114         
0.00002       0.00001       0.00001       0.00001       0.00001      
U 0.4385          (0.8883)        0.1186          0.2360          0.0952         
0.00015       0.00021       0.00009       0.00013       0.00008      
S.E. 0.0953          0.0220          (0.2434)        0.0956          0.0305         
0.00003       0.00002       0.00005       0.00003       0.00002      
I 0.1028          0.0598          0.1421          (0.5142)        0.2094         
0.00004       0.00004       0.00005       0.00009       0.00006      
F 0.0187          0.0139          0.0139          0.0491          (0.0956)       
0.00001       0.00001       0.00001       0.00001       0.00002      
Duration 9.8532          1.1257          4.1081          1.9450          10.4560       
0.00082       0.00013     0.00038     0.00016     0.00099       
Note: Pooled instantaneous transition matrix computed using monthly data from 
the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 following the 
procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Annex 1. Computations are based 
on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. Standard errors are reported in italics. 
OLF=Out of the Labor Force, U=Unemployment rate, I=Informal Salaried, 
SE=Informal Self-employed, F=Formal Sector. 
  40Table 5. De-Trended Flows: Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
Standard Correlations
Deviations U/W.A.P. F/E.A.P. G.D.P.
Shares
O.L.F./W.A.P. 1.61 0.55 -0.83 -0.14
U/W.A.P. 0.82 1.00 -0.60 -0.49
S.E./E.A.P. 2.86 0.48 -0.96 -0.16
I/E.A.P. 2.02 0.68 -0.92 -0.05
F/E.A.P. 4.60 -0.60 1.00 0.12
De-trended Flows
O.L.F. to U 0.70 0.77 -0.26 -0.52
O.L.F. to S.E. 0.24 -0.18 0.01 -0.07
O.L.F. to I 0.21 -0.35 0.05 0.41
O.L.F. to F 0.18 -0.61 0.30 0.44
U to O.L.F. 4.38 -0.34 0.00 0.30
U to S.E. 1.50 0.03 -0.11 -0.50
U to I 2.54 -0.64 0.14 0.58
U to F 3.67 -0.64 0.27 0.67
S.E. to O.L.F. 0.77 -0.13 0.04 -0.11
S.E. to U 0.56 0.75 -0.25 -0.59
S.E. to I 0.79 -0.23 0.10 0.12
S.E. to F 0.50 -0.56 0.29 0.31
I to O.L.F. 1.08 -0.37 0.14 0.09
I to U 1.07 0.69 -0.23 -0.68
I to S.E. 1.27 -0.34 0.17 -0.08
I to F 2.22 -0.68 0.28 0.47
F to O.L.F. 0.20 -0.28 0.13 -0.03
F to U 0.21 0.10 0.08 -0.19
F to S.E. 0.17 -0.56 0.21 0.23
F to I 0.37 -0.19 -0.08 0.23
 
Note: Transition rates among sectors inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each 
period using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 
following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Annex 1. Computations are based on 
10.000 Monte Carlo replications. OLF=Out of the Labor Force, U=Unemployed, I=Informal 
Salaried, SE=Informal Self-employed, F=Formal Sector AP=Active Population, WAP=Working 
ages population, EAP=Employed in working ages population. The series have been averaged per 
quarter and de-trended using a HP filter with smoothing parameter 10
5 
  41Table 6. Model in levels (contemporaneous)  
D e p e n d e n t :  S e c t o r  S i z e 123456
Effective Tariff 0.92 -2.82
2.98 2.62
Imports Penetration -1.14 -4.45
4.49 3.76
Tenure 1.66 *** 1.06 ***
0.23 0.22
Overtime -11.50 *** 1.09
1.94 1.56
Union 16.56 *** 12.57 ***
2.65 2.78
C 80.40 *** 80.52 *** 77.31 *** 84.84 *** 76.98 *** 75.80 ***
0.14 0.31 0.43 0.76 0.53 1.11
R2 (Weighted) 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994
R2 (Unweighted) 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
Durbin Watson 0.70 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.75
D e p e n d e n t :  I n d u s t r y  D i f f e r e n t i a l 123456
Effective Tariff 0.06 0.09
0.07 0.09
Imports Penetration -0.36 *** -0.42 ***
0.14 0.10






C 4.12 *** 4.15 *** 4.17 *** 4.11 *** 4.12 *** 4.13 ***
0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05
R2 (Weighted) 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.998
R2 (Unweighted) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Durbin Watson 1.15 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.14 1.08
D e p e n d e n t :  C r e a t i o n 123456
Effective Tariff 0.38 *** 0.46 ***
0.13 0.11
Imports Penetration -0.65 *** -0.51 ***
0.10 0.09
Tenure -0.05 * -0.06 **
0.03 0.03




C 0.40 *** 0.46 *** 0.51 *** 0.48 *** 0.45 *** 0.70 ***
0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04
R2 (Weighted) 0.781 0.770 0.757 0.768 0.761 0.808
R2 (Unweighted) 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Durbin Watson 1.64 1.69 1.68 1.63 1.65 1.74
D e p e n d e n t :  D e s t r u c t i o n  ( U ) 123456
Effective Tariff -0.001 -0.001
0.003 0.004






Union 0.006 ** 0.003
0.003 0.003
C 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.010 *** 0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.012 ***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
R2 (Weighted) 0.807 0.797 0.812 0.806 0.812 0.792
R2 (Unweighted) 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39
Durbin Watson 1.86 1.87 1.87 1.86 1.87 1.89
 
Note: For all models, the number of included observations is 20, the number of Cross-section included is 18 and the 
total pool observations are 360. 
  42Legend 
Coefficients in bold; SD in italics 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Creation  Proxy of formal job creation (% of people moving from OLF, U, SE, I to F out of total OLF, U, SE and I). 
Pooled (by year) instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey 
(PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section III. 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Destruction  Proxy of formal job destruction (% of people moving from F to U out of total F). Pooled (by year) 
instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 
1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section III. Computations 
are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Sector size  Share of formal (F) on specific sector workforce 
Industry 
differentials 
Industry informality differentials (betas coming from 1st stage regression in which F is explained with 
individual characteristics and industry differentials) 
Effective 
Tariff 
Effective protection (scaled by 10
-3). Sources are: Kume et al. (2003) for 1987-1998; Pinheiro and Bacha 
de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986 
Imports 
Penetration 
Imports penetration (weighted imports/consumption). Sources are: Muendler (2002) for 1987-1999; 
Pinheiro and Bacha de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986; Nassif and Pimentel (2004) for 1999-2002 
Tenure  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with tenure (in years) of workers fired in the specific industrial 
sector (average 1983-1987) 
Overtime  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with the proportion of workers working more than 44 hours in the 
specific industrial sector (average 1983-1987) 
Union  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with union enrollment - understood as % of unionized workers in 
the specific industrial sector - (average 1986 and 1988) 
 
  43Table 7a. Model in levels (dynamic) 
Variable Sector Size Industry Differentials Creation Destruction
Dependent (-1) 0.64 *** 0.46 *** 0.07 0.071
0.06 0.05 0.07 0.054
Dependent (-2) 0.17 *** 0.18 *** 0.29 *** 0.053
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.050
Effective Tariff -1.08 0.03 0.28 * -0.003
2.02 0.09 0.16 0.004
Import Penetration -8.17 ** -0.31 *** -0.43 *** -0.005
3.19 0.10 0.15 0.005
Tenure 0.44 *** 0.02 * 0.24 *** 0.000
0.12 0.01 0.04 0.001
Tenure (-1) -0.24 -0.05 *** -0.32 *** 0.000
0.16 0.01 0.02 0.000
Overtime 3.21 *** 0.23 *** -0.78 *** 0.001
0.99 0.04 0.04 0.003
Overtime (-1) -5.56 *** -0.29 *** 0.65 *** -0.006 ***
1.38 0.06 0.06 0.002
Union 0.21 0.11 -0.56 *** 0.018 ***
1.24 0.10 0.16 0.003
Union (-1) 3.07 ** -0.14 * 0.51 *** -0.016 ***
1.52 0.07 0.08 0.002
C 14.80 *** 1.53 *** 0.49 *** 0.012 ***
3.91 0.26 0.07 0.003
R2 (Weighted) 0.997 0.998 0.765 0.810
R2 (Unweighted) 0.986 0.964 0.736 0.378
Durbin Watson 2.08 2.06 2.10 2.03
Included observations 18 18 18 18
Cross-section included 18 18 18 18




Coefficients in bold; SD in italics 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Creation  Proxy of formal job creation (% of people moving from OLF, U, SE, I to F out of total OLF, U, SE and I). 
Pooled (by year) instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey 
(PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section III. 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Destruction  Proxy of formal job destruction (% of people moving from F to U out of total F). Pooled (by year) 
instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 
1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section III. Computations 
are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Sector size  Share of formal (F) on specific sector workforce 
Industry 
differentials 
Industry informality differentials (betas coming from 1st stage regression in which F is explained with 
individual characteristics and industry differentials) 
Effective 
Tariff 
Effective protection (scaled by 10
-3). Sources are: Kume et al. (2003) for 1987-1998; Pinheiro and Bacha 
de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986 
Imports 
Penetration 
Imports penetration (weighted imports/consumption). Sources are: Muendler (2002) for 1987-1999; 
Pinheiro and Bacha de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986; Nassif and Pimentel (2004) for 1999-2002 
Tenure  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with tenure (in years) of workers fired in the specific industrial 
sector (average 1983-1987) 
Overtime  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with the proportion of workers working more than 44 hours in the 
specific industrial sector (average 1983-1987) 
Union  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with union enrollment - understood as % of unionized workers in 
the specific industrial sector - (average 1986 and 1988) 
  44Table 7b. Model in differences 
Variable Sector Size Industry Differentials Creation Destruction
Dependent (-1) -0.34 *** -0.45 *** -0.68 *** -0.653 ***
0.06 0.05 0.13 0.043
Dependent (-2) -0.30 *** -0.25 *** -0.12 -0.290 ***
0.06 0.05 0.13 0.045
Effective Tariff 0.51 0.24 *** 0.52 *** 0.000
2.57 0.08 0.17 0.005
Import Penetration 1.88 0.01 -0.28 0.007
5.22 0.24 0.25 0.008
Tenure 0.40 *** 0.03 *** 0.26 *** 0.000
0.11 0.01 0.02 0.000
Tenure (-1) 0.02 -0.03 *** -0.12 *** -0.001
0.11 0.01 0.04 0.001
Overtime 4.46 *** 0.26 *** -0.99 *** 0.004 **
1.16 0.06 0.09 0.002
Overtime (-1) -7.71 *** -0.29 *** -0.12 0.014 ***
1.36 0.06 0.13 0.002
Union -0.82 0.19 *** -0.58 *** 0.017 ***
1.25 0.07 0.08 0.003
Union (-1) -6.86 *** -0.27 *** 0.20 * 0.002
1.25 0.07 0.11 0.002
C -1.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.001 ***
0.12 0.01 0.01 0.000
R2 (Weighted) 0.417 0.672 0.076 0.436
R2 (Unweighted) 0.401 0.538 0.673 0.405
Durbin Watson 2.08 2.07 2.19 2.17
Included observations 17 17 17 17
Cross-section included 18 18 18 18
Total pool observations 306 306 306 306
 
Legend 
Coefficients in bold; SD in italics 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
x(-1)  First lag of x 
x(-2)  Second lag of x 
Creation  Proxy of formal job creation (% of people moving from OLF, U, SE, I to F out of total OLF, U, SE and I). 
Pooled (by year) instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey 
(PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section 
III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Destruction  Proxy of formal job destruction (% of people moving from F to U out of total F). Pooled (by year) 
instantaneous transition computed using monthly data from the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 
1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in section III. Computations 
are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. 
Sector size  Share of formal (F) on specific sector workforce 
Industry 
differentials 
Industry informality differentials (betas coming from 1st stage regression in which F is explained with 
individual characteristics and industry differentials) 
Effective 
Tariff 
Effective protection (scaled by 10
-3). Sources are: Kume et al. (2003) for 1987-1998; Pinheiro and Bacha 
de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986 
Imports 
Penetration 
Imports penetration (weighted imports/consumption). Sources are: Muendler (2002) for 1987-1999; 
Pinheiro and Bacha de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986; Nassif and Pimentel (2004) for 1999-2002 
Tenure  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with tenure (in years) of workers fired in the specific industrial 
sector (average 1983-1987) 
Overtime  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with the proportion of workers working more than 44 hours in the 
specific industrial sector (average 1983-1987) 
Union  Dummy (active since 1989) interacted with union enrollment - understood as % of unionized workers in 
the specific industrial sector - (average 1986 and 1988) 
  45Table 8. Sources of provision of health services before reforms: % structure by 
labor sector in 1981 
 
Where did the person receive attention S.E. I F
Public network 47.80 58.93 46.65
Private network 51.01 40.33 52.26
Both 1.19 0.74 1.09 
 
Who paid the attention: S.E. I F
Particular 55.93 39.86 30.50
Social Security 33.39 46.30 35.37
Pre paid 3.83 2.30 6.63
Employer 3.16 5.84 24.15
O t h e r 3 . 0 24 . 8 82




Note: These results are based on the sample of working household heads and the 
members of their household (the employment category of the household head is 
assigned to the rest of the members of the household) 
 




Table 9. Shares of Formal and Informal sectors with respect the Working ages 
population (in percentages) 
Survey Urban Rural Metropolitan Non Metropolitan
F PNAD 1981 57.37 18.51 65.57 38.92
PME 1983 63.25
I and S.E. PNAD 42.63 81.49 34.43 61.08
PME 36.75
Workforce under 15 y.o. (PNAD) in MM 55.12 19.56 24.81 49.87
F PNAD 1990 54.57 26.68 61.04 42.16
PME 61.34
I and S.E. PNAD 45.43 73.32 38.96 57.84
PME 38.66
Workforce under 15 y.o. (PNAD) 70.20 22.52 30.07 62.66
F PNAD 2001 46.78 20.00 51.52 38.95
PME 52.96
I and S.E. PNAD 53.22 80.00 48.48 61.05
PME 47.04
Workforce under 15 y.o. (PNAD) 102.80 18.21 39.87 81.14  
 
Source: PNAD and PME. PME’s figures correspond to September of the corresponding year. 
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G.D.P. cycle (H&P) G.D.P. (annual growth)  
* H&P filter applied with smoothing parameter 10
5
 

































































































O.L.F. U  
*Out of working ages population. 
 
Figure 3. Share of Formal (F), Informal (I) and Self-employment (S.E.) sectors out 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 9. Trade Openness and Control Variables of Constitutional Changes Vs. 
Hiring Rates/Size of the Formal Sector 


















































































































































































































Imports Penetration (Average 1983-1987)  
B. Control Variables of Constitutional Changes 
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% workers enrolled to an Union (1986)
 
Note: Bubbles’ sizes reflect the relative size of the industrial sector. The regression lines are obtained from 
WLS univariate regressions where weights are determined by the size of the industrial sector. 
  53Figure 10. Simulations of the impact of trade and firing costs 























































































Actual Fitted No trade No Constitution  






















































































Actual Fitted No trade No Constitution
 























































































Actual Fitted No trade No Constitution
 
Note: Creation (ALL to F) and Destruction (F to U) “actual” rates are inferred from the continuous time 
transition matrix for each period using yearly pooled data from the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 
1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Annex 1. Computations are 
based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. Fitted rates are estimated from regressions reported in Table 7. 
Simulated rates estimated from regressions reported in Table 7 fixing Effective Tariff and Imports 
Penetration to its initial values (“No trade” scenario) or setting the Dummy to be 0 in all periods (“No 
Constitution” scenario). In all cases, the series correspond to the Industry Sector average (compounded by 
sub-sectoral inputs weighted by the participation of each Industry Sub sector) 

























































































Shimer no trade Shimer no Constitution  
Note: the actual size of the formal sector is constructed using monthly data from the 
Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002. This series has been 
aggregated per year and corresponds to the Industry sector average (compounded by 
sub-sectoral inputs weighted by the participation of each Industry Sub sector). The 
predicted sizes are obtained applying equation in footnote 24 on the fitted values 


























































































Actual Shimer fix Destruction Shimer fix Creation
 
Note: the actual size of the formal sector is constructed using monthly data from the 
Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002. This series has been 
aggregated per year and corresponds to the Industry sector average (compounded by 
sub-sectoral inputs weighted by the participation of each Industry Sub sector). The 
predicted sizes are obtained applying equation in footnote 24 and correspond to the 
steady state size of F applying the 1983-2002 average transition rate of F to ALL and 
ALL to F respectively. F = formal, ALL = not formal. 



































































































Wage SE/Wage F Wage I/Wage F G.D.P. (H&P) Right Scale
 
Note: Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002. The series have been averaged 
per quarter. I=Informal Salaried, SE=Informal Self-employed, F=Formal Sector. 
  56